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Abstract
This Essay elaborates in three ways the call for a renewal of social science approaches to
international law advanced by Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton, and Tom Ginsburg. First, while
we affirm the importance of what they call the “scientific method” of hypothesis testing, we argue
that it can and must be complemented by several other well-institutionalized social science
approaches to international law. Second, we loosen the conventional “internal”/“external”
distinction in legal scholarship and make the case that conceptualization and empirics are integral
to both approaches. Third, we propose that the full promise of social science approaches to
international law can only be realized when the international is held in dynamic and temporal
tension with the national and local. Expanding scholarship on transnational legal orders and
ordering brings theory and research on international law (including conventional “internal”
approaches) into productive engagement with growing bodies of socio-legal research and scholarship
(the so-called “external” view), with mutual benefits for both. The Essay illustrates the promise
of the transnational legal order framework with two illustrations, one from international trade
law through the World Trade Organization and the other from international commercial law
created and promulgated by United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
This Essay responds to the call for a renewal of social science approaches to
international law advanced by Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton, and Tom Ginsburg.1
In their framework essay to this symposium, they define “the conventional social
science approach to law” as “clearly stating a research question, developing
hypotheses, using a research design to test that hypotheses based on some form
of qualitative or quantitative data, and presenting conclusions, all while
acknowledging the assumptions upon which they are based and the level of
uncertainty associated with those results.”2 They label this form of research an
“external approach to law,” which they (conventionally) contrast with “internal,”
“doctrinal” scholarship that is “descriptive” and “normative.”3 They then illustrate
their argument with empirical studies of international law involving such issues as
whether Bilateral Investment Treaties lead to increased investment flows between
the countries that sign them, the effectiveness of international human rights
agreements, and the efficacy of international dispute resolution.4
Our Essay elaborates their call for social science in three ways. First, while
we affirm the importance of what they call the “scientific method” of hypothesis
testing, we argue that it can and must be complemented by several other wellinstitutionalized social science approaches to international law. Second, we
reconceive the links between internal and external approaches to international law
by proposing that conceptualization and empirics are integral to both approaches.
We thus loosen the conventional “internal”/“external” distinction in legal
scholarship, which is reflected in their essay and in critiques of the empirical
approach that they advocate. Third, we propose that the full promise of social
science approaches to international law can only be realized when the international
is held in dynamic and temporal tension with the national and local, thus also
permeating the international/national law dichotomy as reflected in
methodologically nationalist scholarship. Processes of transnational legal ordering
and the rise and fall of what we conceptualize as “transnational legal orders”
(TLOs) bring theory and research on international law (including conventional
“internal” approaches) into productive engagement with growing bodies of sociolegal research and scholarship (the so-called “external” view), with mutual benefits
for both. In these ways, our approach can provide a bridge between those

1

2
3
4

Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International Law and Its
Applications, 22 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2021). As they note, such empirical study was earlier extensively
surveyed and assessed in Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Law
Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012).
Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 5.
Id.
Id. at 16–17, 21.
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adopting internal (doctrinal) and external (empirical) approaches to international
law.

II. A MPLIFYING “T HE S OCIAL S CIENCE A P PROACH TO
I NTERNATIONAL L AW ”
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg present a particular version of “social science”
based on deductive reasoning in which hypotheses are developed and tested.
There are clear advantages to the deductive approach that they highlight. The
researcher aims to be objective, posits a hypothesis, gathers data, and lets the data
speak, either confirming or disproving hypotheses. In the process, this work can
(and should) inform social decision making.
While this aspect of social-science engagement with law has many merits and
is a critical component of a comprehensive project, a review of the extensive
anthropological,5 sociological,6 political science,7 economic,8 and sociolegal9
literatures on international law and institutions demonstrates that a multiplicity of
methods and theories compose the richly textured promise of social science for
the study and practice of international law. First, the complementarity of other
empirical approaches is necessary because frequently, the most important
questions cannot readily be reduced to quantitatively measurable variables. Even
if they can be, there is an absence of valid and reliable data on cross-sectional or
time-series studies of states and supranational institutions. Second, this
complementarity is necessary because the ability to produce a verifiable theory
relies on prior stages of understanding, concept development, and hypothesis
production, and likewise depends upon later types of empirical research to make
meaning of results that all too often are conflicting, ambiguous, or lacking in much
5

6

See, e.g., GALIT SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CULTURE OF THE
WORLD BANK (2012); SALLY MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2006).
See, e.g., GREGOIRE MALLARD, FALLOUT: NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL FRACTURE
(2014); JOHN HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS: PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE HAGUE
TRIBUNALS (2003); JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000).

7

See, e.g., ABRAHAM NEWMAN & HENRY FARRELL, OF PRIVACY AND POWER: THE TRANSATLANTIC
STRUGGLE OVER FREEDOM AND SECURITY (2019); BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009); Emilie Hafner-Burton & James Ron,
Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and Quantitative Eyes, 61 WORLD POL. 360 (2009).

8

See, e.g., DANI RODRIK, ECONOMICS RULES: THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE DISMAL SCIENCE
118, 144 (2015) (stressing that useful economic analysis requires choices among models that involve
both science and craft).
See, e.g., GREGORY SHAFFER, EMERGING POWERS AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE PAST
AND FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (forthcoming 2021); Alexandra Huneeus,
Pushing States to Prosecute Atrocity: The Inter-American Court and Positive Complementarity, in THE NEW
LEGAL REALISM: STUDYING LAW GLOBALLY VOL. II 225, 228–29 (Heinz Klug & Engle Merry eds.,
2016).

9
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explanatory power.10 Hypothesis testing therefore is neither the starting point nor
the ending point of social science work, but rather one important component of
ways that social science can address law’s relationships with society, politics, and
the economy. 11
The embeddedness of hypothesis testing in a wider multi-faceted enterprise
of social science can be seen in the development of an extensive body of
interdisciplinary scholarship in the past several years on the normative
development, rise, contestation, and fall of TLOs.12 This line of research and
theory arose from an intuitive sense that a new framework was needed to
understand and address the scope and diversity of social, economic, civil, health,
environmental, and other problems that engage law across national frontiers, and
in which international law is a component. The empirical realities of legally salient
issues within and beyond the state required a theoretical framework that could
reach across the entire landscape of problems purported to be susceptible to
resolution or mitigation with the assistance of international hard and soft law. In
addition, the diversity and dynamism of real-world issues demanded a framework
that synchronically and diachronically embraces international, national, and local
law, because normative development within these planes is inextricably
intertwined in practice in ways that have grown over time.
From a social science perspective, the TLO framework emerged initially with
an awareness that specific hypotheses or highly abstract frames respectively
provided no systematic way to compare, contrast, and learn from developments
in areas of law involving social problems from which one could build conditional
theory subject to empirical confirmation, refinement, or disconfirmation,
including for purposes of problem-solving.13 We began with a high-level concept,
“order,” and both processual (“ordering”) and institutional (“orders”) expressions
of this concept, which could bring sociological and legal frames to encompass the
bewildering diversity of social problems and their relation to law, regulation, and
governance. Here we consciously displaced an exclusive focus on international law
by situating international law within the frame of transnational legal ordering. We

10

See, for example, studies on the question of whether international investment agreements induce
greater flows of foreign direct investment, a topic raised both in Abebe et al., supra note 1, and
Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 1. But see JONATHAN BONNITCHA, LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN
& MICHAEL WAIBEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 155–79
(2017).

11

But see CARLO ROVELLI, SEVEN BRIEF LESSONS ON PHYSICS 23 (2014) (“Science begins with a vision.
Scientific thought is fed by the capacity to ‘see’ things differently than they have previously been
seen.”).
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015).

12
13

Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 1 (discussing the importance of developing conditional theory in
the study of international law).
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brought old (“institutionalization”) and new (“recursivity”)14 social science
concepts to channel empirical research across and within conventionally defined
subject areas of law, which then could be compared for the purposes of broader
theory development.15 We refined these further with the specification of
inductively derived mechanisms that have been observed to drive cycles of legal
change beyond the state until they reach a kind of moving equilibrium (or relative
“settlement”) in what we characterize as a TLO.
While we elaborate further elements of this framework for social science
engagement with international law below, suffice it to say here that this phase of
theory development owes more to a Weberian genre of social science research on
law than to a particular genre of strict hypothesis testing in contexts where
quantitative data are already available or can be constructed.16 It is a phase of
inductive extrapolation and synthesis, of concept development and invention, of
proposals for encompassing theory that may offer frames, then propositions, and
press ultimately toward specific hypotheses that may be tested. In fact, in the first
round of case studies using TLO theory, scores of hypotheses emerged, all
susceptible to some form of historical, qualitative, or quantitative examination,
that can be pursued in the refinement of such theory.17 Therefore, we contend
that social science approaches importantly include framework construction,
concept elaboration, as well as hypothesis generation and testing, involving both
deductive and inductive reasoning.
This expansive understanding of social science extends to methods.18 While
we share with Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg an appreciation of multiple social
14

Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and National
Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOCIO. 1135 (2007).

15

For studies across different areas, see TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 12;
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE (Gregory Shaffer ed., 2013). For studies
within a particular area of law, see TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(Gregory Shaffer & Ely Aaronson eds., 2020); Tom Ginsburg, Terence C. Halliday & Gregory
Shaffer, Constitution-Making as Transnational Legal Ordering, in CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 1 (Gregory Shaffer, Tom Ginsburg & Terence C. Halliday eds.,
2019); Seth Davis & Gregory Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Fiduciary Law, 5 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L,
TRANSNAT’L & COMPL. L. 1 (2020) (introducing a symposium issue). For a study of the globalization
of legal education that reflects and feeds into these processes, see BRYANT GARTH & GREGORY
SHAFFER, THE GLOBALIZATION OF LEGAL EDUCATION: A CRITIQUE (forthcoming 2021).

16

See MAX WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils trans.,
Harvard University Press 1954) (1925).

17

See Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Researching Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 12, at 518–24. On the importance of emergent analytics involving
“discovery,” see Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World
Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 85, 119–21, 131, 136–37 (2009).

18

There are debates within the social sciences regarding the relative advantages and disadvantages of
deductive and inductive approaches, as well as whether social science can aspire to theory testing
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science methods, we posit that the methodological norm in social science research
embraces an array of qualitative methods as commonly as quantitative methods,
which do not necessarily involve hypothesis testing, but also concept
development, hypothesis formulation, and discovery. Systematic interviewing,
participant observation, archival research, and systematic textual analysis, among
others, are conventionally deployed in leading schools of the social sciences with
the recognition that a privileging of a particular method leads less to a richer
empirical understanding of issues than to a constriction of realms of empirical
inquiry. But what is common to all these methods is that they form part of a larger
process of social inquiry that includes some form of empirical verification, even if
a problem, data set, or method cannot yield a hard quantitative result.
In sum, where we have common ground with Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg
is, first, in their call for empirical research that includes hypothesis testing. Second,
we agree that such research should start with a social problem, not a mere
intellectual one. We stress, however, that researchers should recognize that the
very conception of social problems involves social constructions implicated by
ideology, politics, and social positioning, reflecting a researcher’s background,
interests, and proclivities.19 Just as Anthea Roberts noted how international law is
not “international” in that different national traditions reflect and propagate
different conceptions of international law,20 so the conceptualization of social
problems and thus the variables that measure how effectively problems are
addressed will reflect a researcher’s positioning. The very framing of an issue as a
problem constitutes an intervention in the world to the extent that the researcher
intends her research to be relevant and useful.

III. P ERMEATING THE I NTERNAL -E XTERNAL B INARY FROM
THE P ERSPECTIVE OF P RACTICE
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg build upon a longstanding distinction
between “internal” views of international law, which are characterized by
descriptive, normative, and doctrinal analysis, and “external” approaches, which

19

20

in the same way as the natural sciences. See, e.g., BENT FLYVBJERG, MAKING SOCIAL SCIENCE
MATTER (2001); IAN SHAPIRO, THE FLIGHT FROM REALITY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2005). In
practice, inductive and deductive work always interact. Inductive probing leads to new hypotheses;
and hypotheses inform inductive probing. As John Dewey stressed, researchers revise hypotheses
through experience in response to the social problems they study. John Dewey, Logical Method and
Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 24–26 (1924).
Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, Participant Objectivation, 9 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 281, 283 (2003)
(“What needs to be objectivized [ ] is . . . the social world that has made both the anthropologist
and the conscious or unconscious anthropology that she (or he) engages in her anthropological
practice.”).
See generally ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? (2017).
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examine the law from the outside, how it came to be, and its consequences.21 Our
research indicates that it may be time to loosen this distinction from the
perspective of actual practice. To start, breaking down this binary will
constructively expand the contributions that social science can make to internal as
well as external legal questions. In addition, from a pragmatist perspective of social
science and social action, both internal and external approaches have more in
common than indicated by a strict separation. In particular, both operate within
particular social contexts, and both conceptualize and aim to address perceptions
of particular social problems.
On the one hand, for too long sociologists and other social scientists treated
the internal processes of lawmaking, and, even more, the very substance and form
of international law itself, as a black box—a region of activity colonized by lawyers
and left to their exclusive epistemological claims. This separation of study suited
the lawyers because it erected a fence around their mostly invisible doings. Our
work, in part, aims to show how the social scientist can constructively open up
this black box and reveal how doctrinal development can be leveraged as instances
of behavior subject to social science inquiry.
Extending a line of scholarship on the rhetorical properties of global legal
norms and scripts,22 Block-Lieb and Halliday show that the varieties of law
produced by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL)—legislative guides, model laws, treaties—comprise a repertoire of
rule-types, embedded in other rhetorical contexts such as preambles and
glossaries.23 These texts reflect, on the one side, an adaptation to the political
challenge of finding global consensus on legal norms, and, on the other side, a
prospective anticipation of what institutions (courts, executive agencies,
legislatures) in nation-states could accept as international normative guidance to
bring national law into concordance with such global norms. 24
This work illustrates how a mere description of either the substantive or
doctrinal elements of international hard and soft law fails to capture the fullness
21

22

23
24

Taking from H.L.A. Hart, Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg define “an ‘internal’ view of international
law,” as “an approach that, whether descriptive or normative, is at its core a doctrinal exercise—as
opposed to an ‘external’ view of international law—that is an approach that examines the law from
outside, seeking how it came to be or what its consequences might be in the real world.” Abebe et
al., supra note 1, at 5.
See SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CRAFTING OF WORLD MARKETS 227 (2017); Terence C. Halliday, Susan
Block-Lieb & Bruce G. Carruthers, Rhetorical Legitimation: Global Scripts as Strategic Devices of
International Organizations, 8 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 77 (2010); Alexander E. Kentikelenis & Leonard
Seabrooke, The Politics of World Polity: Script-writing in International Organizations, 82 AM. SOCIO. REV.
1065 (2017).
See generally BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 22.
See TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & BRUCE CARRUTHERS, BANKRUPT: GLOBAL LAWMAKING
SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009).
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of ideological, political, and problem-solving work internalized in the very formal
character of the law itself, whether looking back on where the law came from or
looking forward to where the law is directed. When the substantive provisions of
these laws are matched with the normative and material interests of lawmakers
and the ecological dynamics of lawmaking processes, the normativity of law opens
up more fully to social scientific exploration. In a pragmatic logic almost as strong
as the “should” in normative approaches to law, a close examination of
international law’s doctrinal content and form can be posed by the social scientist
as a contingent proposition: if actors want a given outcome (as a normative ideal
or pragmatic aim), what will be the substantive and formal properties of the law
most likely to bring it about? This task is firmly within the epistemological
mandate of both the social sciences and internal participants in legal processes. In
other words, “internal” actors developing, interpreting, and critiquing
international hard and soft law texts are highly interested in so-called “external”
questions. Additionally, empirical research can be valuable for understanding and
adapting the doctrine to dynamic changes in the world with which law interacts.
Similarly, through systematic interviewing, Shaffer found that internal actors
are equally interested in understanding the processes that he studies, as they were
“themselves engaged in quasi-social scientific ‘studies’ of the same processes.” 25
They too wished to understand and respond to legal processes and the issues that
they address. They too aimed to “make sense” of developments in the trade law
world that he studied, as they must respond to a continuously unfolding present
on partial information in real time. They were interested in his work for the
insights it might provide for the tasks before them.26 Internal work, from this
perspective, involves more than doctrine, but includes the relation of doctrine to
concrete areas of legal practice. 27
As legal realists have long stressed, internal and external approaches often
mesh in practice.28 Within the concept of internal approaches, we include both
25

Shaffer, supra note 9, at xiv (quoting Douglas R. Holmes & George E. Marcus, Para-Ethnography, in
2 THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS 595 (Lisa M. Given ed., 2008))
(“By treating our subjects as collaborators, as epistemic partners, our analytical interests and theirs
can be pursued simultaneously, and we can share insights and thus develop a common analytical
exchange.”).

26

Stewart Macaulay earlier documented the dilemma lawyers found in developing, applying, or
ignoring contract law in the U.S. domestic context in relation to business goals. Stewart Macaulay,
Non-Contractual Relations and Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOCIO. REV. 55 (1963).
BRIAN TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY 194 (1995) (“The notion of practice is an
essential concept for a realistic approach because it joins behavior (activity) with interpretation (the
meaning which informs the activity).”). Tamanaha nonetheless conceived of an internal/external
divide in terms of the observer (participant or non-participant) and the observed (internal or
external view of the practice). Id. at 177.

27

28

See Gregory Shaffer, The Legal Realist Approach to International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
THEORY: FOUNDATIONS AND FRONTIERS (Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark Pollack eds., forthcoming 2021).
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positivist doctrinal approaches and the internal work of instrumental actors that
draft and interpret legal texts.29 Instrumental actors, by definition, aim to define,
interpret, and shape legal norms in light of their conception of a problem, and
thus are concerned with assessing the empirical implications of norm formulation
and norm application. Doctrinal internal approaches may purport not to be
instrumental, but even so, they vary in the extent to which they expressly or
implicitly take context into account. Legal positivists such as H.L.A. Hart address
the social meaning of texts which implicitly reflects context.30 Even Ronald
Dworkin can be viewed, in part, as adopting a Weberian concept of verstehen (or
understanding) when he characterizes an “internal point of view” as that of those
engaged in legal argumentation—that is, those participants engaged in the
“constructive interpretation” of law’s meaning.31 In a related Weberian vein,
sociologist Roger Cotterrell contends that “in order to understand law, the legal
sociologist has to understand it as a participant, or as a participant does, or rather
as many different kinds of participants do—lawyers or citizens, for example, living
in the world of law.”32 We would not go so far as to say “must,” as the stance
depends on the empirical question asked, and whether one adopts a Weberianinterpretivist or Durkheimian-positivist position on social science. As argued in
Section II, we call for a broad tent in conceptualizing social science approaches to
law. Nonetheless, many social science studies of law would benefit from a closer
understanding of the legal process.
Those adopting an internal approach participate in a social process in which
they aim to contribute to the understanding and elaboration of legal norms. They
help define, explicate, elaborate, and otherwise shape the meaning of legal norms
as applied to different contexts. They do so at the international level, whether
through the presentation of legal briefs and arguments before international
tribunals and the rendering of decisions by these tribunals, or at other stages in
the legal process, whether through treaty drafting, the development of non29

Charles Barzun, Inside-Out: Beyond the Internal/External Distinction in Legal Scholarship, 101 VA. L. REV.
1203, 1209–10 (2015) (noting that Hart also characterized the distinction as between genuine versus
instrumental rule followers).

30

See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW vii, 113 (1961) (explaining that one of the two
“minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system” is that “its rules
of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must
be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behavior by its officials” and
characterizing this work as “descriptive sociology”).
Compare RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 13, 52–53 (1986) (discussing constructive
interpretation involving justification and fit), with MAX WEBER, SELECTIONS IN TRANSLATION 18–
19 (W.G. Runciman ed., Eric Matthews trans., 1978), and MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 88 (Talcott Parsons ed., A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons
trans., 1964) (defining verstehen). Similarly, the philosopher John Rawls stresses the role of “reflective
equilibrium” in theorizing. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20 (1971).
ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW’S COMMUNITY 369–70 (1996).

31

32
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binding model agreements and guides for national legislators, the formulation of
indicators to measure national and business compliance with legal norms, or the
drafting of studies (such as by the U.N. International Law Commission presented
to the U.N. General Assembly or by U.N. Special Rapporteurs presented to the
U.N. Human Rights Council). Other bodies reference these texts at the
international, national, and local levels (including domestic courts), further
conveying, embedding, and reshaping legal norms as part of a transnational
process. Scholarly doctrinal analysis, in turn, aims to further critique, refine, and
otherwise influence such normative development.
Legal realists, working in the pragmatist tradition, contend that all norms are
developed in social and political contexts and they must be subject to constant
evaluation based on experience, which drives norm development.33 Hanoch
Dagan, for example, conceptualizes the legal realist understanding of law in terms
of the constitutive tensions between internal and external factors, namely those of
reason and power, legal craft and empirics, and tradition and progress.34 Legal
realists combine empirical analysis of law with internal decision making and
critique in light of the social context to which law is applied.35 Empirical work can
be ignored, diagnostics can be based on plausible folk theories,36 and law can be

33

34

35

36

Those working in a legal realist tradition, from Holmes, Cardozo, and Llewellyn, to contemporary
legal scholars, focus on the application of texts to social facts. Compare Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) (establishing the bad man theory of law), with BENJAMIN
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 179 (1921) (contending law is subject to an
“endless process of testing and retesting”), KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS 60 (1960) (studying law “as it works”), and Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 17 (on
the importance of conditional theory and emergent analytics in relation to social facts).
Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607 (2007). Relatedly, Brian
Tamanaha shows how legal realists have been mislabeled as radical skeptics of law, whereas,
although they were critical of legal doctrine not adapted to social context, they believed that law
can serve as an “instrument” to advance “the social good,” and they “fervently labored to improve
it.” BRIAN TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN
JUDGING 93–94 (2010).
In this vein, the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey stressed the importance of combining internal
principles and external analysis in legal decision making, writing:
For the purposes of a logic of inquiry into probable consequences, general
principles can only be tools justified by the work they do. They are means of
intellectual survey, analysis, and insight into the factors of the situation to be
dealt with. Like other tools they must be modified when they are applied to new
conditions and new results have to be achieved. Failure to recognize that general
legal rules and principles are working hypotheses, needing to be constantly
tested by the way in which they work out in application to concrete situations,
explains the otherwise paradoxical fact that the slogans of the liberalism of one
period often become the bulwarks of reaction in a subsequent era.
Dewey, supra note 18, at 26.
Terence C. Halliday, Plausible Folk Theories: Throwing Veils of Plausibility over Zones of Ignorance in Global
Governance, 69 BRIT. J. SOCIO. 936 (2018).
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simply expressive and symbolic,37 which is why empirics are important.
Nonetheless, when actors aim to develop norms to shape behavior, they benefit
from empirics. A realistic conception of law is not either/or (internal reason or
external agency and structure), but both at once. Such an approach is particularly
important for the development of processual theorizing and pragmatic problemsolving in which social contexts change.
Most importantly, the danger of insisting on too tight of a dichotomy for
both doctrinal and empirical scholarship is that it cuts off inquiry, rather than
opening up new spaces for investigation and critique. As Charles Barzun writes,
the internal/external distinction
rarely serves as a useful conceptual tool to clarify issues or open up avenues
of inquiry. Instead, it operates mainly as a rhetorical weapon whose function
is to insulate particular substantive views from arguments deemed to be
threatening to it. Its tendency has thus been to cabin scholarly debate about
the nature and purposes of law, rather than to widen it, and to dampen
original thinking about such questions, rather than to stimulate or
provoke it.38

By loosening the distinction, more legal issues become relevant for empirical
inquiry, and better understanding of legal practice will inform more nuanced
empirical analysis.

IV. R ESEARCHING T RANSNATIONAL L EGAL O RDERS AND
O RDERING
The framework of studying norm development and change through
transnational legal ordering processes illustrates the rich possibilities open to
empirically oriented scholars. Traditionally, international law focused
predominantly on interstate relations—“the law of nations”—such as regards
territorial sovereignty, the treatment of foreign nationals’ person and property,
and war and peace.39 Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s essay, though grounded in
our time, still tends to focus on traditional international law between nation-states.
Over time, however, the scope of international law expanded to cover most
substantive areas of law, from human rights and criminal law to regulatory law
and business transactions. In parallel, the scale of international norm-making
swelled, as actors aimed to use international hard and soft law and processes to
37
38
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MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964).
Barzun, supra note 29, at 1209–10; see also Pierre Schlag, Normativity and Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 801, 920 (1991) (“[T]he rhetorical conventionality of the inside/outside distinction and its
derivative, the internal/external perspective, have enabled controversial matters to be assumed into
and out of existence without being questioned.”).
Read, for example, the table of contents of 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE,
PEACE (1905) and 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, WAR AND NEUTRALITY
(1906).
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reach deep into state law and institutions.40 Today, international law is an
instrument for social ordering that involves much more than relations among
states, as international law now addresses most areas of social life. The expanded
scope and scale of international law—its breadth and depth—opens a vast array
of subject areas for empirical study.
To study these developments, we created a theoretical framework that places
international law in a broader transnational perspective, one that builds from
empirical work and, in turn, develops hypotheses for further empirical
investigation. In this work we develop a framework for the study of the
transnational development of legal norms in which international law plays a role.
By transnational legal ordering, we refer to the processes through which legal
norms are framed, propagated, settled, institutionalized, contested, and changed
transnationally. These processes can give rise to what we call a TLO—a collection
of legal norms and associated organizations and actors that shape the understanding
and practice of law across national jurisdictions in a particular field.41 These norms
are not static, but dynamically and recursively change within a transnational
context in which norm making and practice at the international, national, and local
levels interact. In a series of books and articles, we have applied this framework
with others to a broad array of issue areas, ranging from regulatory and private
law to constitutional and human rights law. 42
The TLO framework, with its emphasis on legal orders and ordering, brings
an integrated sociolegal vocabulary and method to international law thoroughly
grounded in social science. Researchers begin by identifying how agents of legal
change frame a problem to be mitigated by law, a characteristic method of
sociologists and anthropologists. If a settled TLO is the goal of policy
entrepreneurs, researchers must discover which longer-term facilitating
circumstances and shorter-term precipitating conditions thrust an issue onto
policy agendas beyond nation-states. Through different empirical research
methods, law and social science scholars observe how actors mobilize to address
economic, social, political, and other problems through means that entail
international law. Research will reveal which combinations of substate, state, and
supra-state actors, together with non-state, civil society and market actors, engage
each other in a bid to produce legal responses. Reflecting normative and material
interests, actors at different levels of social action—local, national, and

40

Gregory Shaffer & Carlos Coye, From International Law to Jessup’s Transnational Law, from Transnational
Law to Transnational Legal Orders, in THE MANY LIVES OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL
ENGAGEMENTS WITH JESSUP’S BOLD PROPOSAL 126 (Peer Zumbansen ed., 2020).
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TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 12, at 5 (defining a TLO as “a collection of formalized
legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the understanding
and practice of law across national jurisdictions”).
See supra note 15.
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international—engage in transnational legal-ordering processes often through a
mix of cooperation, competition, and conflict. 43
An empirically grounded conditional theory will assess the circumstances in
which an institutionalized TLO emerges. A TLO consists of more than a codified
body of international law; it exhibits perceptible concordance of legal norms
across transnational, national, and local levels of lawmaking and practice. Such
legal ordering is constantly in motion. Legal change within a state or by a state can
impel change in international law, just as change in international law can influence
law reform by states and local institutions. Empirical research will reveal the
degree to which relatively settled law results both formally and in practice, so that
the law is predictable for practitioners and regulatory subjects.
We derive from TLO research on business and finance, human rights, and
regulation in international law an extensive array of hypotheses which serve at
least two purposes.44 One is to underline the contingencies of TLOs: the
conditions under which they rise and decline, and cooperate and compete; the
circumstances in which they are propagated and resisted, and adapted and
rejected; and the varieties of forms they can take in different issue-areas and in
their temporal and geographical manifestations. Another is to display the
extensive breadth of empirical inquiries, accompanied by the full panoply of social
science methods, that open up for social scientists and legal scholars in mutually
respectful partnership. TLO theory brings social science disciplines into
conversation with law, and concomitantly brings scholars studying domestic legal
change into engagement with counterparts studying international and
transnational legal change.

V. E XEMPLIFYING S OCIAL S CIENCE S CHOLARSHIP ON
I NTERNATIONAL L AW WITHIN A TLO F R AMEWORK
We now briefly summarize two research projects that illustrate the empirical
study of transnational legal ordering and the settlement and unsettlement of
TLOs.

43

Compare Gregory Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements and
Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706 (2010) and TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDERS, supra note 12 (discussing different forms of cooperative, competitive, and antagonistic
alignment of legal-ordering processes), with BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 23 (highlighting
cooperation, competition, competitive cooperation, and conflict).
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See, e.g., Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Researching Transnational Legal Orders, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 12, at 475, 518–24.
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A. Illustration One: International Trade Law as “Public Law”
and Practice
Gregory Shaffer’s forthcoming book, Emerging Powers and the World Trading
System, exemplifies how international trade law developed through recursive
interaction between domestic and international law and practice.45 On the one
hand, the United States had the greatest impact in shaping WTO norms. Many of
its norms came out of U.S. law and practice, ranging from intellectual property
and import relief law to the timelines for WTO dispute settlement and the
organizing principles for WTO negotiations. Other countries, such as Brazil,
India, and China (which are the three case studies covered in the book) adapted
their laws, institutions, and professions in light of WTO norms. When they
became adept at international trade law, they successfully challenged U.S. practices
and resisted U.S. pressure on them, which helped catalyze U.S. disenchantment
with the liberal economic order that it had been central in creating. Shaffer’s
empirical study started with a problem—the role of trade law capacity in shaping
norms and affecting outcomes. The work included a quantitative study based on
an original survey, and systematic interviewing and participant observation over
time.46 It traced the contribution of legal capacity to the settlement and
unsettlement of national and international trade law norms and practices within
and across these major countries, implicating the broader international trading
system.

B. Illustration Two: International Trade Law as “Private Law”
and Practice
In Global Lawmaking, Block-Lieb and Halliday show how a social science
approach to lawmaking by UNCITRAL, one of the leading international
organizations that creates international private law, affirms and extends the call by
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg for applying social science to the study of
international law, while exemplifying the potential of alliances between social
science and legal scholars.47 They begin with three transnational problems, which
are framed by ecologies of actors: to save failing businesses, especially those whose
assets and liabilities cross borders; to free up capital for investment in transitional
and developing economies; and to forestall the emergence of regional blocs that
45

SHAFFER, supra note 9.
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Id. The work illustrates the benefits of partnering with those in other disciplines (such as political
science) and those embedded in other national settings (such as in Brazil, China, and India). The
book’s case studies were written with Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin (Brazil), Henry Gao (China),
and James Nedumpara and Aseema Sinha (India). The underlying survey and its analysis were
conducted with political scientists Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt.
BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 23.
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govern transport of goods through international waters. They demonstrate
empirically that close attention to the process of developing transnational legal
orders in three areas of commercial law to address these problems—corporate
bankruptcy, secured transactions, and carriage of goods by sea—shows that the
distinction between the “external” and “internal” substantially dissolves.
Quantitative measurement of delegations’ participation in lawmaking and
rhetorical analysis and counts of substantive rule-types demonstrate ways that the
external penetrates almost entirely inside the internal such that codified doctrine
both reflects and anticipates the economic and social and political contexts in
which it orders behavior through legal norms. The study exemplifies the necessity
of triangulating methods: archival research, participant observation, interviews,
textual analysis, and coding and quantitative analysis of official records and official
proceedings. In so doing, it responds less to a specific hypothesis, nor is it intent
on presenting new hypotheses readily tested by quantitative methods. Rather, it
endeavors to amplify the power of the TLO framework, expanding and refining
its theoretical elements, and presents findings about efforts to institutionalize new
legal orders that approach the pragmatics of innovative global governance.

VI. C ONCLUSION
In sum, we contend that law should no longer be studied in a
methodologically nationalist perspective involving a sharp dichotomy of
international and national norm development and practice, as reflected in
predominant internal and external scholarly approaches. The national and
international development of legal norms and practices transnationally intertwine
and beckon for empirical study. The process of creating and elaborating the TLO
framework itself demonstrates the richness of possible social science engagement
with international law, including internal approaches to international law. It
emerged as a way to bring some theoretical coherence to an enormously
heterogeneous body of international law scholarship on a diverse array of issues
framed as problems to be addressed through law. It involved the creation of new
concepts—transnational legal ordering, transnational legal orders—and the
incorporation of other concepts (recursivity, concordance, settling, alignment)
into an integrated framework. That in turn has been creatively and critically
applied by social scientists and international law specialists to business and
finance, health and medicine, human rights, climate change, international crime,
and fiduciary relationships. From these applications, scholars have generated
scores of hypotheses and propositions on framing, rising and falling, propagating
and resisting, and institutionalizing and structuring TLOs. The “testing” of these
hypotheses has often not been possible by quantitative methods. More often the
theory has been advanced by historical and qualitative social science empirical
research. In this respect the TLO framework holds the promise of substantially
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enhancing social science engagement with international law with the prospect of
mutual enrichment. In so doing, it amplifies the spirit—and widens the scope—
of Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s call for scholarship on international law
enriched by social sciences.
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